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DEVISING A MICROSOFT REMEDY THAT SERVES
CONSUMERS
John E. Lopatka* & William H. Page**
INTRODUCTION
According to Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, Microsoft was a "pre-
dacious" monopolizer that did extensive "violence ... to the competitive
process."' Through a "single, well-coordinated course" of anticompetitive
action,2 it suppressed competition from Netscape's Navigator, an Internet
browser, and from Sun's Java programming language and related technolo-
gies. Microsoft "mounted a deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts,.
. placed an oppressive thumb on the scale of competitive fortune,... and
trammeled the competitive process."3 Having colorfully concluded that
Microsoft's offenses were extreme, Judge Jackson deferred to the govern-
ment's demand for a drastic remedy.4 He ordered that Microsoft be broken
into two firms: one confined to the operating systems business, and the
other to the applications business.5 He also imposed a set of conduct re-
strictions, some applying to both firms, which remain in effect for the ten-
year duration of the judgment, and some applying primarily to the operat-
ing systems business, which remain in effect until the two businesses es-
tablish their independent viability.6 The Supreme Court refused expedited
review of the district court's decision and remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,7 where it is now pending.
This Article attempts to identify an appropriate legal response to the
offenses Microsoft was found to have committed. The ultimate criterion of
the appropriateness of a remedy is straightforward: a remedy should serve
* Alumni Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, lopatka@law.sc.edu.
** Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law,
page@law.ufl.edu.
I United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) appeal denied, cause
remanded by 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2000) appeal denied,
cause remanded by 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000) ("Plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason alone have some
entitlement to a remedy of their choice."). The litigation against Microsoft was the consolidation of a
case brought by the United States and one pursued by nineteen states. See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at
35. For simplicity, we refer to the plaintiffs in these cases as the government.
5 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64-65.
6 Id. at'65-71. Judge Jackson stayed the final judgment pending disposition of Microsoft's ap-
peal. United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 98-1232 (Order of June 20, 2000), available at
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/98-1232v.pdf.
7 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000).
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consumers. Such a remedy will result in markets that closely resemble
those that would have emerged but for Microsoft's unlawful behavior. The
optimal remedy will minimize the sum of the expected costs of future mis-
conduct, anticompetitive effects of past misconduct, lost efficiencies in
product composition, firm structure, and multi-firm collaboration, impaired
incentives to innovate, and administration, including enforcement of the
remedy and the antitrust laws. Judged by this standard, the court's decree
falls short.
Part I begins by setting forth in some detail the conduct the court held
illegal. Although we disagree with many of the court's factual and legal
characterizations of Microsoft's conduct,8 we generally accept them for
purposes of analyzing the remedy. Part I then sets out briefly the terms of
the court's remedial order. Part II, after a description of the conditions that
might justify structural relief, presents the argument that structural relief is
inappropriate in Microsoft. This Part concludes that any severe restructur-
ing of Microsoft, including the separation of its applications and operating
systems activities ordered by the court, will almost certainly raise prices to
consumers and will likely fail to produce long-term competitive benefits.
Part III sketches the content of a conduct remedy tailored to promote con-
sumer interests and identifies a number of ways in which the decree's con-
duct provisions subvert that objective.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDERS
As explained more fully below, any antitrust relief should address the
violations proven.9 This Part includes a description of the primary offenses
found by the district court and a brief summary of the court's remedies for
those offenses. The remedies are examined in greater detail in the remain-
der of the article.
8 For our views on the merits of the charges against Microsoft, see John E. Lopatka & William
H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 157 (1999); William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, The Dubious Search for "Integration " in
the Microsoft Trial, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1251 (1999); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, An Offer
Netscape Couldn 't Refuse?: The Antitrust Implications of Microsoft's Proposal, 44 ANTITRUST BULL.
679 (1999). For our critique of earlier litigation against the firm, see John E. Lopatka & William H.
Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic
Theory in Antitrust Decision Making, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 317 (1995) [hereinafter Lopatka & Page,
Network Externalities]. We offered a brief analysis of remedies in the instant case, before the court
issued its liability determination, in John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, A (Cautionary) Note on Reme-
dies in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 25 (Summer 1999).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 335 (1947) ("The essential considera-
tion is that the remedy shall be as effective and fair as possible in preventing continued or future viola-
tions of the Antitrust Act in the light of the facts of the particular case.").
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A. The Liability Determinations
The court found that Microsoft possesses monopoly power in "the li-
censing of all Intel-compatible PC operating systems worldwide,"1 and
that an "applications barrier to entry" protects Microsoft's dominant market
share.11 Because most applications are both costly to write and operate with
only a single operating system, applications will tend to be written to the
operating system with the greatest number of users; users, for their part,
will choose the operating system to which the greatest number of applica-
tions have been written, thereby creating a "positive feedback loop."' 2 In a
phrase, the operating system market exhibits network effects. Thus, the
court found that over 70,000 applications have been written to Microsoft's
Windows, 3 a number far greater than the 12,000 plus applications written
to the next most popular operating system, Apple's Mac OS,14 and appar-
ently the approximate number of applications the court believes any new
operating system would have to offer users in order to be a viable com-
petitor to Windows.
The thrust of the court's liability determinations is that Microsoft acted
illegally to maintain an applications barrier to entry by excluding "middle-
ware" competitors. Netscape developed Navigator, an Internet browser,
which exposed some applications programming interfaces (APIs). 5 APIs
allow an application program to call upon functions provided in an under-
lying program, so that the ability to perform the function need not be writ-
ten into the application program itself.'6 Software producers could then
write applications to Navigator instead of to the underlying operating sys-
tem, and Navigator itself was written, or "ported," to multiple operating
systems, so that the particular operating system to which any version of
Navigator was written would have little commercial significance.' 7 Navi-
gator, therefore, is a form of middleware, because it relies on the APIs ex-
posed by the underlying operating system while simultaneously exposing
its own APIs. In the now-famous words of Bill Gates, Netscape threatened
"to commoditize the underlying operating system."'' 8
Similarly, Sun Microsystems developed a technology, called Java, that
10 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37. The court found that Microsoft's share of the market for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems has exceeded ninety percent every year for the past decade and
has been at least 95 percent for the last couple of years. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d
9, 35 (D.D.C. 1999).
"1 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
12 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 36-42.
13 Id. at 40.
14 Id. at 47.
15 See id. at 68-69.
16 Id. at 2.
17 d. at 69.
18 Id. at 72.
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also functioned as middleware. It was intended to enable applications writ-
ten in the Java language to run on multiple operating systems with minimal
porting.' 9 Sun's objective was captured in the slogan, "write once, run
anywhere."2 Though the Java technology has so far achieved limited suc-
cess,2 it posed the same kind of threat to Microsoft's market power in op-
erating systems that Navigator represented.22 Applications written in Java
can only operate on computers that have been enabled to read Java "byte-
code," or computers that carry a "Java runtime environment,"'23 and Net-
scape agreed to include a copy of Sun's Java runtime environment with
every copy of Navigator.24 As a result, any Windows computer in which
Navigator has been installed is able to read Java bytecode. Navigator be-
came the principal method by which Sun placed copies of its Java runtime
environment on Windows computers.
The court found that Microsoft acted illegally to impair the commercial
success of middleware, primarily by impeding the distribution and use of
Navigator. The court did not find, however, that Microsoft initially
achieved its market dominance unlawfully. After all, the network effects
that serve to maintain the applications barrier to entry naturally push a mar-
ket toward a dominant supplier. 6 And, the court found insufficient evi-
dence that "absent Microsoft's actions, Navigator and Java already would
have ignited genuine competition in the market for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems. '27 Rather, "Microsoft has retarded, and perhaps alto-
gether extinguished, the process by which these two middleware technolo-
gies could have facilitated the introduction of competition into an important
market., 28 The court concluded, therefore, that Microsoft violated section 2
of the Sherman Act by unlawfully maintaining monopoly power in the PC
operating systems market.29 The court also concluded that Microsoft vio-
lated section 2 by attempting to monopolize the Internet browser market,30
and violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by unlawfully tying the Win-
19 Id. at 74.
20 Id.
21 Id. For a useful description of the technological limitations of Java, which have limited its
popularity, see Andrew Shuman, Weak Java, Slate (Sep. 26, 1997) at http://www.slate.com/
Webhead/97-09-26/WebHead.asp.
22 As the court stated the point, "Simply put, middleware threatened to demolish Microsoft's
coveted monopoly power." Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
23 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
24 Id. at 76.
25 Id.
26 The government recognized this in earlier litigation against Microsoft. See Lopatka & Page,
Network Externalities, supra note 8, at 354.
27 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
28 Id.
29 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
30 Id. at 45-46.
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dows operating system and the Internet Explorer (IE) browser.31 Neverthe-
less, the court held that Microsoft's vertical arrangements with various on-
line services (OLSs), Internet content providers (ICPs), independent soft-
ware vendors (ISVs), and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) did
not violate section 1 's prohibition against exclusive dealing.32 Much of the
conduct found anticompetitive related to more than one legal theory, and it
is the conduct that informs the determination of remedies. We thus turn to a
description of the major practices condemned by the court.
First, Microsoft bundled Windows and IE, initially by contract, and then
technologically.33 Microsoft included code for early versions of IE in the
installation disks for Windows 95 shipped to OEMs. The Windows licenses
prohibited OEMs from modifying or deleting any part of Windows, in-
cluding 1E, even though it was technologically possible to do so, prior to
shipment to consumers.34 As a result, every consumer who received a com-
puter loaded with Windows automatically received IE. Microsoft bound a
later version of IE to Windows 95 by placing browser-specific code in the
same files as code that provided traditional operating system functions.35
Shared files could not be entirely deleted without impairing the operating
system. Though some of the browser-specific code could be removed with-
out impairing the operating system, the removal process was not feasible
for OEMs, and they remained contractually bound not to disable IE any-
way.36 But, Microsoft provided users with an easy method (i.e., use of the
"Add/Remove" function) to configure the operating system so that IE
would not launch.37 Microsoft introduced IE 4.0 with Windows 98 and in-
tegrated the browser more deeply into the operating system by creating
more shared files.38 Windows 98 did not offer users a simple way to pre-
vent IE from launching.39 The result of all of this was to increase the prob-
ability that IE was accessible to users of Windows.
Second, Microsoft limited the freedom of OEMs to modify the Win-
dows desktop or change the "boot" sequence in ways that might have in-
creased consumer use of Navigator.40 Specifically, Microsoft refused to
permit OEMs to remove the IE icon or IE program entries from the desktop
31 Id. at 47.
32 Id. at 53.
33 Id. at 39. The practice was relevant to the claim that Microsoft illegally maintained monopoly
power in operating systems, id., the claim that Microsoft attempted to monopolize the browser market,
id. at 45, and the tying claim. id. at 49-51.
34 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
35 Id. at 16 1.
36 Id. at 164.
37 Id. at 165.
38 Id. at 168-69.
39 Id. at 170.
40 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39. This conduct was relevant to the monopoly maintenance and
attempted monopolization claims and, to a limited extent, the tying claim. Id. at 45, 49-5 1.
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or "Start" menu.41 It refused to allow OEMs to add to the initial boot se-
quence any program promoting Navigator that might appear on a computer
before the user is presented with Windows. 42 It prohibited OEMs from in-
stalling programs promoting Navigator that would launch automatically
upon completion of the initial Windows boot sequence.43 It prohibited
OEMs from adding icons or folders that were not similar in size and shape
to icons it supplied." And, it prohibited OEMs from using its Active
Desktop feature to display third-party brands.45
Third, Microsoft offered important OEMs positive inducements to favor
IE over Navigator in promotion and distribution, and it threatened them
with negative consequences if they favored Navigator.46 In particular, Mi-
crosoft gave large-volume OEMs reductions in royalties, co-marketing
funds, and in-kind assistance for promoting IE, such as by setting IE as the
default browser, and it offered additional consideration to OEMs that
agreed not to pre-install Navigator.4 7 It threatened to terminate certain co-
operative activities with OEMs that balked, and it initiated various coop-
erative ventures with the competitors of one OEM that announced its inten-
tion to work with Netscape.48
Fourth, Microsoft induced Internet access providers (IAPs) to act in
ways that increased IE's browser usage share.49 It licensed IE and the IE
Access Kit to them for no charge,5" though the government did not allege
and the court did not find that Microsoft had engaged in predatory pricing.51
Microsoft provided the ten most important IAPs placement in the Windows
95 Referral Server, which allowed a user to subscribe to an IAP's service
easily through use of the Internet Connection Wizard contained in Win-
dows 95 and displayed on the desktop; in exchange for this placement and
other consideration, the IAPs agreed to promote and distribute IE preferen-
41 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
42 Id. at 7209.
43 Id. at 211.
44 Id. at 213.
45 Id.
46 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
47 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1 230-238.
48 Id. at 232, 236-37.
49 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39. The conduct was relevant to the monopoly maintenance and
attempted monopolization claims.
50 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 77 250-51.
51 Indeed, the court specifically found that
[t]he inclusion of Internet Explorer with Windows at no separate charge increased
general familiarity with the Internet and reduced the cost to the public of gaining
access to it, at least in part because it compelled Netscape to stop charging for
Navigator. These actions thus contributed to improving the quality of Web brows-
ing software, lowering its cost, and increasing its availability, thereby benefiting
consumers.
Id. at T 408.
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tially over Navigator.12 These lAPs could not promote Navigator or provide
Navigator to customers who did not specifically request it, and their distri-
bution of Navigator could not exceed a given percentage of their total
browser distribution, usually twenty-five percent53 Microsoft provided
America Online (AOL) and three other OLSs favorable placement on the
Windows desktop and other consideration in exchange for their agreement
to distribute and promote IE nearly exclusively.54 Microsoft also granted
rebates and made some payments to the ten most important IAPs in ex-
change for their efforts to upgrade existing subscribers to software that was
bundled with IE rather than Navigator.5
Fifth, Microsoft supplemented its efforts to hamper the distribution of
Navigator through the OEM and IAP channels by inducing Apple, ICPs,
and ISVs to act to Netscape's disadvantage. 6 Specifically, Microsoft
threatened to cancel the development and sale of its popular Office appli-
cations suite ported to the Mac OS, a product that was crucial to Apple's
survival, unless Apple agreed to distribute and promote IE for Macintosh
personal computers more favorably than Navigator.57 As a result, ISVs
were less likely to view Navigator as cross-platform middleware.5 s Micro-
soft offered benefits, such as free licenses to incorporate IE, to induce ICPs
and ISVs not to focus on Navigator's APIs when developing their
products.5 9
Sixth, Microsoft used various tactics to increase the difficulty of porting
applications written in Java from Windows to other platforms, and vice
versa.' In particular, it created a Java implementation for Windows that
undermined the portability of programs written in Java. Thus, Java pro-
grams that were written to use Sun's method of interacting with the under-
lying operating system would not run on Microsoft's Java implementation,
and those written to use Microsoft's method would not run on any imple-
mentation other than Microsoft's.6 Microsoft then induced ISVs to use the
Microsoft-specific Java technology, in part by making its implementation
technically superior and by offering various benefits.62 It also used its mar-
52 Id. at 9 253-58.
53 Id. at $ 258.
54 Id. at 99 272-306. The court used the term "Internet access provider" to encompass online
services and Internet service providers (ISPs). See id. at 15.
55 Id. at 99 259-60.
56 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43. These measures related to the monopoly maintenance and
attempted monopolization claims.
57 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 341-56.
58 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
59 Id. at 42-43; Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at T$ 334-35, 340.
60 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 43. This conduct relates primarily to the monopoly maintenance
charge.
61 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 9 387-90.
62 Id. at 99 395-402.
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ket power to pressure firms like Intel from developing products that would
benefit cross-platform Java implementations.63
Finally, when browsers were first being developed, Microsoft made a
"market division proposal" to Netscape under which Netscape would aban-
don its plans to provide a browser for Windows operating systems, which
could function as an applications platform, and focus instead on browsers
for non-Windows operating systems and on other Internet-related
software.64 For its part, Microsoft would provide browsing technology for
Windows machines, and it would grant Netscape preferential access to pro-
prietary technical information.65 Microsoft threatened to delay the provision
of information necessary to ensure that Navigator would operate well on
systems running Windows 95 unless Netscape agreed to the plan. Netscape
nevertheless refused to assent, and Microsoft did in fact delay the provision
of the technical information Netscape needed.'
The government also claimed that the restrictive agreements with vari-
ous OLSs, ICPs, ISVs, Compaq, and Apple, which were an important part
of the court's finding of section 2 violations, were independently illegal as
exclusive dealing arrangements under section 1.67 The court, however, held
that the arrangements survived rule-of-reason scrutiny because they "failed
to foreclose absolutely outlets that together accounted for a substantial per-
centage of the total distribution of the relevant products . "..."68 Still, the
court emphasized that the lack of sufficient market foreclosure for a Section
1 violation "in no way detracts from the Court's assignment of liability for
the same arrangements under [section] 2. "69
B. The Remedial Order
To redress the violations found, the court ordered structural relief cou-
pled with conduct restrictions. The divestiture, which would break Micro-
soft into an Operating Systems Business (OpCo) and an Applications Busi-
ness (AppCo), is supposed to be completed within twelve months of the
63 Id. at 396, 404-06.
64 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46. The incident related solely to the attempted monopolization
claim.
65 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at TT 79-92.
66 Id. at 77 90-92.
67 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
68 Id. at 52. The court stated:
Notwithstanding the extent to which these 'exclusive' distribution agreements preempted the
most efficient channels for Navigator to achieve browser usage share, however, the Court
concludes that Microsoft's multiple agreements with distributors did not ultimately deprive
Netscape of the ability to have access to every PC user worldwide to offer an opportunity to
install Navigator.
Id. at 53.
69 Id. at 53.
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expiration of the stay pending appeal.7° Certain conduct restrictions are
primarily of an interim nature, and most were intended to take effect almost
immediately and remain in effect for at least three years after implementa-
tion of the reorganization plan, though they apply only to the OpCo for the
post-implementation period.7 Other restrictions, designed to implement the
divestiture, become effective only upon reorganization, continue for the
ten-year duration of the final judgment, and apply to both businesses.72
The heart of the decree is the divestiture. Assets related to the produc-
tion and licensing of operating systems, narrowly defined, are assigned to
the OpCo; everything else, including assets related to IE, the Office appli-
cations suite, and other client and server applications, is assigned to the
AppCo.73 Intellectual property related both to operating systems and other
products is assigned to the AppCo, but the OpCo receives a perpetual, roy-
alty-free license to use it.74 The OpCo also receives the right to develop,
license, and distribute modified or derivative versions of the joint intellec-
tual property that is unrelated to the browser; it does not receive the right to
develop derivative browsers.75 Transactions between the two companies are
restricted. The two are prohibited from "entering into any Agreement with
one another under which one of the Businesses develops, sells, licenses for
sale or distribution, or distributes products or services ... developed, sold,
licensed, or distributed by the other Business,, 76 with one exception. The
two companies may "licens[e] technologies (other than Middleware Prod-
ucts) to each other for use in each others' products or services provided that
such technology (i) is not and has not been separately sold, licensed, or
offered as a product, and (ii) is licensed on terms that are otherwise consis-
tent with this Final Judgment., 77
70 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000).
71 Id. at 66, 70-71. These restrictions are to "remain in effect until the earlier of three years after
the Implementation of the Plan or the expiration of the term of this Final Judgment," which is 10 years.
Id. at 66. After the restrictions take effect and before the structural reorganization occurs, the restrictions
apply to the single Microsoft Corporation; after reorganization and during at least the next three years,
the restrictions apply only to the Operating Systems Business. Id. at 65, 66, 69. Though all of these
restrictions were intended to take effect ninety days after entry of the order regardless of any appeal, the
court subsequently stayed the final judgment "in its entirety until the appeal therefrom is heard and
decided, unless the stay is earlier vacated by an appellate court." United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ.
No. 98-1232 (order entered June 20, 2000).
72 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 66, 70-71.
73 Id. at 64, 71-72.
74 Id. at 64.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 65.
77 Id. The decree defines "middleware product" as follows:
i. Internet browsers, e-mail client software, multimedia viewing software, instant
messaging software, and voice recognition software, or ii. software distributed by
Microsoft that - (1) is, or has in the applicable preceding year been, distributed
separately from an Operating System Product in the retail channel or through Inter-
net access providers, Internet content providers, ISVs or OEMs, and (2) provides
functionality similar to that provided by Middleware offered by a competitor to Mi-
2001]
GEO. MASON L. REv.
II. CHOOSING BETWEEN STRUCTURAL AND CONDUCT REMEDIES
The Supreme Court has said that an antitrust remedy should "restore
competition.""8 "Restore," not "create:" the goal of the remedy should be to
return the market to a baseline condition that would have prevailed in the
market but for the defendant's anticompetitive acts, not to reshape the mar-
ket to approximate a competitive ideal. Moreover, the decree "must not be
punitive., 79 A decree should be commensurate with the offense;" ° it should
deprive the offender of the benefits of the violation"' but not the benefits of
lawful conduct. This means that the remedy should not harm consumers by
deterring hard competition, efficient arrangements, or innovation. In gen-
eral, the optimal civil antitrust remedy will minimize the sum of the ex-
pected costs of future misconduct of the kind found unlawful, anticompeti-
tive effects of past misconduct, lost efficiencies in firm integration, multi-
firm collaboration, and product configuration,82 impaired incentives to in-
novate, 83 and administration, including enforcement of the remedy and the
antitrust laws.
Divestiture is the "most drastic" antitrust remedy,84 and "it is not to be
used indiscriminately, without regard to the type of violation or whether
other effective methods, less harsh, are available. 85 It is appropriate only if
it would restore competition and "other measures will not be effective to
redress a violation."86 A remedy is effective if it stops the anticompetitive
crosoft.
Id. at 72-73.
78 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961). See also United
States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1911) (noting that an antitrust court has a "duty of
giving complete and efficacious effect to the prohibitions of the statute").
79 DuPont, 366 U.S. at 326. Accord United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338 (1947).
80 See generally H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968) ("The guiding
principle is that of a proportion within a system of penalties between those imposed for different of-
fences where these have a distinct place in a commonsense scale of gravity."); JACK M. KRESS,
PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE 69-70 (1980); Anthony Bottoms, The Philosophy and Politics of Punish-
ment and Sentencing, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds.,
1995); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS 184-86 (1996).
81 United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944) ("Those who violate the
Act may not reap the benefits of their violations and avoid an undoing of their unlawful project on the
plea of hardship or inconvenience.").
82 We use the term efficiencies of "product configuration" to denote efficiencies in both produc-
tion and consumption. As to consumption, it includes, for instance, benefits consumers might derive in
the form of reduced search costs or convenience in acquisition or operation flowing from a particular
product design as well as economies of scale in consumption, or network effects, incident to a common
standard.
83 In this calculus, the expected cost of reduced incentives to innovate refers to incentives damp-
ened by the remedy itself. Any loss in innovation caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct is taken
into account as an anticompetitive effect.
T4 Du Pont, 366 U.S. at 326.
85 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603 (1951) (Reed, J., concurring).
86 Du Pont, 366 U.S. at 327.
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conduct and leads to the rapid restoration of markets untainted by anticom-
petitive effects. Even if structural and conduct relief would be equally ef-
fective, a conduct remedy is nevertheless preferable if any higher adminis-
trative costs it entails are outweighed by lower costs of lost efficiencies and
stifled innovation. We argue in this Part that a conduct remedy in Microsoft
would be effective and the structural remedies proposed in this case would
in fact be not merely ineffective but, on balance, harmful to consumers and
society.
A. Conduct Relief Would Be Effective
In general, conduct relief can be ineffective for two reasons. First, a
conduct order might be unenforceable, and thus unsuccessful in stopping
the defendant's illegal conduct. Second, even if a conduct decree were ef-
fective in blocking illegal conduct, it might nevertheless fail to restore
competition if the market is locked into a position that is the result of prior
exclusionary behavior. Neither of these conditions is present in Microsoft.
1. Stopping Illegal Activity
The district court suggested that Microsoft cannot be stopped from en-
gaging in its predatory conduct, at least not without entangling the court in
continuing and costly supervision.87 This argument proceeds from the
premise that Microsoft will defy or attempt to evade any restrictions im-
posed on its anticompetitive behavior. This asserted recalcitrance might
relate to a conduct decree in two ways. First, Microsoft might simply dis-
obey the clear mandates of an order, thereby necessitating future litigation.
Second, it might be impracticable to draft an order that would constrain
Microsoft and be enforceable at a reasonable cost. Neither possibility is an
insuperable obstacle to conduct relief in Microsoft.
The first concern is insubstantial. 8 Nothing in Microsoft's history indi-
cates the breath-taking insolence that deliberate defiance of a court order
87 According to one report, the court was strongly influenced by a desire to avoid ongoing super-
vision. Judge Jackson "called restructuring the company 'less regulatory' because it would ultimately
require less continuing oversight by the court. 'The less supervision by this court, the better,' he said."
John R. Wilke, For Antitrust Judge, Trust, or Lack of It, Really Was the Issue, WALL ST. J., June 8,
2000, at Al. But another report suggested that Jackson had a different motivation. See infra note 88.
88 According to one newspaper report, Judge Jackson "decided on a breakup because he thought
Microsoft had been responsible for the failure of out-of-court settlement talks. 'Judicial intervention-
forcible application of law-became a last resort,' Jackson said. 'And in my judgment, Microsoft's
intransigence was the reason."' James V. Grimaldi, Microsoft Judge Says Ruling At Risk, Wash. Post,
Sept. 29, 2000, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39357-
2000Sep28.html. This account suggests that the court was not as much concerned with future defiance
of an order as with punishing Microsoft for refusing to agree to a settlement. That certainly is an
impermissible justification to eschew a conduct remedy.
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would represent. The court placed great weight on Microsoft's unwilling-
ness "to accept the notion that it broke the law or accede to an order
amending its conduct."89 But failure to admit wrongdoing is surely not an
indication of bad faith when the litigant is appealing the judgment. Cer-
tainly Microsoft's suggestion that it might appeal any remedial restrictions
imposed by the district court does not imply that Microsoft would disobey
the order.9 The court also baldly stated that "Microsoft has proved un-
trustworthy in the past." 9 Whatever the truth of this characterization, 92 it
ignores the power of a contempt citation. A "willful disregard of the
authority of the court" is a contempt of court.93 The kind of open defiance
under consideration here would likely be both a criminal contempt and a
civil contempt, justifying action both to vindicate the authority of the court
and to induce compliance with the underlying decree,94 and the associated
89 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2000).
90 Judge Jackson "expressed skepticism that Microsoft would willingly comply with behavioral
restrictions," reportedly supporting his view with the comment, "'Even the very mild conduct remedies
they proposed, they said they might appeal those, too."' Wilke, supra note 87. The court specifically
noted that Microsoft "has announced its intention to appeal even the imposition of the modest conduct
remedies it has itself proposed ... " Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
91 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
92 The court supported its charge by saying, without elaboration, "In earlier proceedings in which
a preliminary injunction was entered, Microsoft's purported compliance with that injunction while it
was on appeal was illusory and its explanation disingenuous." Id. Judge Jackson entered an order in
December 1997 prohibiting Microsoft from licensing Windows "on the condition, express or implied,
that the licensee also license and preinstall any Microsoft Internet browser software." United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 545 (D.D.C. 1997). Microsoft contended that it could not offer the
latest version of Windows in operable condition with IE removed, because the two were highly inte-
grated, and so it planned to comply with the order by offering OEMs either an outdated version of
Windows or a new version, with IE removed, that did not work. Jackson reportedly was irate, describing
Microsoft's response to his order as "a thumb in the eye." KEN AULETTA, WORLD WAR 3.0 14 (2001).
When he learned of the plans the following month, he asked a Microsoft official, "It seemed absolutely
clear to you that I entered an order that required that you distribute a product that would not work? Is
that what you're telling me?" The official responded, "In plain English, yes. We followed that order. It
wasn't my place to consider the consequences of that order." JOEL BRINKLEY & STEVE LOHR, U.S. V.
MICROsOFT 9 (2000). This is probably the incident to which the court in its final judgment was refer-
ring. Even if it is, the accusation is nevertheless hard to assess rationally. If Microsoft believed it could
not delete all of the files containing IE without breaking the operating system, it could not offer a func-
tioning version of the new Windows without an implied condition that the licensee take IE, though a
more prudent course in that event would have been to seek clarification from the judge. Still, this single
incident does not imply the level of insolence that would warrant the conclusion that Microsoft would
disobey clear restrictions that are capable of being followed. In any event, the preliminary injunction
was set aside by the appellate court, and though the infirmity of an injunction is not an excuse to disre-
gard it before it is reversed, one wonders whether the court's unflattering characterization of Microsoft's
conduct was colored by the court's chafing at being reversed.
93 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 702
(1982).
94 A federal court has the power to punish as contempt "[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command." 18 U.S.C.A. § 401 (2000). See generally 3 WRIGHT,
supra note 93, § 704, at 823-28, § 714, at 864-66. See also United States v. Nichols, 629 F.2d 619, 627
(9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that "[p]unishment for civil contempt is usually considered to be remedial"
and "must be lifted if the contemnor obeys the order of the court," whereas the penalty for criminal
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penalties can be harsh.95
The second and more serious concern is that, even if Microsoft would
not disobey a clear mandate, the court could not draft an order with suffi-
cient specificity to prohibit the full range of exclusionary practices Micro-
soft might employ, at least not without forcing the court to incur intolerable
administrative costs. If the decree prohibits A, Microsoft will substitute
equally exclusionary practice B and avoid running afoul of the order. The
court will inevitably be forced to assume a regulatory role, deciding time
and again whether practices planned or adopted in fact violate the order, in
other words, whether B is really A. If the court determines that the conduct
violates the spirit but not the letter of the decree, it will have to modify the
decree accordingly; if it finds that the decree did not comprehend the con-
duct, the government will have to institute another antitrust action. Propo-
nents of this argument point to the current Microsoft litigation as proof. The
government initially asserted that Microsoft's bundling of IE and Windows
violated a consent decree resolving a prior case, and that issue was in liti-
gation when the government reasserted the charge as part of an independent
antitrust action.96
The argument depends first on the assumption that Microsoft can
choose from among a large number of good substitutes for any exclusion-
ary practice it used. To be sure, exclusionary practices, like efficient prac-
tices, have substitutes. But just as certainly, the supply is not infinitely
elastic, and it is difficult to say ex ante how large the universe of relevant
predatory conduct is. But the argument also depends on the assumption
that, for an effective order, the government has to contemplate and address
every specific act that Microsoft might use to subvert competition. In fact, a
decree could be quite general while still complying with the requirement
that an injunction "be specific in terms" and describe the conduct to be re-
strained "in reasonable detail." 97 It could, for example, prohibit exclusion-
ary conduct that preserves or threatens to extend Microsoft's monopoly
power in operating systems and the tying of any product to a dominant op-
erating system. Indeed, one court has observed that it "is not uncommon for
contempt "is punitive in nature" and "does not terminate upon compliance with the order").
95 Criminal contempt can be punished by "fine or imprisonment," at the court's discretion. 18
U.S.C.A. § 401 (2000). The statute does not set a maximum penalty for contempts that are not inde-
pendently criminal. Separate successive criminal contempts are punishable as separate offenses. United
States v. Hawkins, 501 F.2d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965, 968
(9th Cir. 1970). "[T]he sanctions for civil contempt are severe." Eve of Milady v. Impression Bridal,
Inc., 986 F. Supp. 158, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In order to compel compliance with an order, a fine for
civil contempt can be set in relation to a firm's net profit, see International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States, 493 F.2d 112, 115-116 (2d Cir. 1973), or its gross sales volume, see Perfect Fit Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 673 F.2d 53, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1982).
96 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing the entry of a
preliminary injunction in the contempt action).
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (West 2000).
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an injunction to repeat a statutory or equivalent prohibition, and this is
proper relief ... in order to prevent the defendant from repeating his viola-
tion in slightly different form ... ." Such an order would likely increase
the need for subsequent judicial interpretation. But it would have the im-
portant effect of issue preclusion in subsequent litigation.99 For example,
the government would not have to prove again that the licensing of PC op-
erating systems is a relevant market, that Microsoft has monopoly power in
it, or that operating systems and browsers are separate products. Moreover,
the order would add the prospect of contempt penalties to the sanctions
otherwise available for antitrust violations, including treble damages when
such claims by injured private parties are not speculative.
A reasonably detailed conduct order, therefore, should be both an effec-
tive deterrent to future misconduct and capable of implementation without
extraordinary effort. The court need not anticipate and specifically pro-
scribe every permutation of the anticompetitive practices it found. It need
only delineate with reasonable precision the categories of prohibited prac-
tices that encompass the conduct found unlawful, and set out plainly Mi-
crosoft's affirmative obligations. As we show more fully below, this is not
a hopeless task.
A conduct remedy, however well-crafted, raises a significant possibility
of future litigation, because it is likely to require some interpretation. In
addition, the government may have to bring independent antitrust actions,
because the conduct order will leave intact a monopolist presumably with
the power to injure competition in ways that are unrelated to the case. But
the total social costs of structural relief will dwarf the costs of a conduct
remedy, even if it results in lower costs of antitrust enforcement. As we
show in the next section, breaking up Microsoft would impose enormous
efficiency losses. Moreover, the idea that structural relief could obviate the
need for future supervision and independent antitrust enforcement in this
industry is fanciful. No substantial structural remedy, including the one set
out by the court, will be self-enforcing. In markets characterized by net-
work effects and related economic conditions, a dominant firm is likely to
emerge. In these markets, distinguishing between aggressively competitive
and exclusionary practices is extraordinarily difficult. The firm that suc-
ceeds in dominating the market will be a ready target for antitrust attack.
Computer software markets, such as those for operating systems and Inter-
net browsers, will predictably breed antitrust litigation, whether in the form
of injunction enforcement proceedings or independent actions, no matter
what the court does to engineer the industry.
98 Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (citations omitted).
99 See generally 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4416, at 136-39 (1981).
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2. Restoring Competition
If predatory behavior has irreversible anticompetitive effects, an order
that does more than stop the anticompetitive conduct may be justified. But
Microsoft is not such a case. If Microsoft is restrained, there is every reason
to expect that the markets in which it has acted anticompetitively will re-
bound rapidly."° The markets for software are exceptionally dynamic,
where innovation is key and entrepreneurs and capital are abundant. This is
not to say that a perfectly competitive market in the classic sense, with a
large number of price-taking suppliers having small market shares, would
emerge were illegal activity to cease. Even without exclusionary behavior,
the market for operating systems is likely to be dominated by a single sup-
plier in a given period. As the district court recognized, the market is char-
acterized by network effects, or economies of scale in consumption.
Moreover, the market exhibits economies of scale in production, producers
can expand output quickly without large product-specific and irreversible
investments, and consumers must make substantial product-specific in-
vestments in learning to use a product. 10' All of these conditions push the
market toward a single dominant supplier at any given time regardless of
anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the court admitted as much when it con-
cluded that Microsoft's product initially "became the predominant operat-
ing system" through no culpable conduct °2 and found insufficient evidence
that, "absent Microsoft's actions, Navigator and Java already would have
ignited genuine competition in the market for Intel-compatible PC operat-
ing systems."'0 3
If the operating system market is a "winner-take-most" market, one
100 Posner has observed, "If the alleged misconduct consists of exclusionary practices rather than
completed acquisitions, an injunction against continuation of the practices will normally be an adequate
remedy (although it may be possible to argue in some cases that an injunction would take too long to
eliminate a monopoly position obtained by exclusionary practices)." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 85 (1976). Even Judge Jackson professed a preference for a conduct
remedy that would allow the market to extirpate the anticompetitive effects. According to one report,
Jackson stated, "The structural remedy was never my remedy of choice, and it is not even so today."
Grimaldi, supra note 88. He continued, "It was always my preference that the market itself be allowed
to rectify the dysfunction disclosed to me by the evidence, failing which a negotiated settlement was
next-best." Id. See also AULETrA, supra note 92, at 370-71 (reporting that Jackson was initially "in-
clined to favor behavior remedies over what he saw as more draconian structural remedies," but ulti-
mately concluded Microsoft could not be trusted).
101 See STANLEY J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT 80-
82(1999).
102 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 6 (D.D.C. 1999). The court attributed
Microsoft's early dominance to IBM's decision to select MS-DOS for pre-installation on its first gen-
eration of PCs. Indeed, in supporting the consent decree resolving earlier litigation against Microsoft,
the government introduced the testimony of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, who opined that Micro-
soft's monopoly was obtained innocently. See Lopatka & Page, Network Externalities, supra note 8, at
333.
103 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
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should not expect an antitrust remedy to yield a market that resembles the
classic model of perfect competition. Instead, the remedy should facilitate
competition for the market. A competitive market characterized by network
effects is likely to exhibit a pattern of serial monopoly, with the winner in
one period either giving way in the next period to another supplier with a
better product or retaining its position by introducing a product better than
the one developed by its competitors."°
The market for browsers also exhibits production scale economies and
instant scalability. However, the consumption economies to scale in syn-
chronization benefits as well as the increasing returns from product-specific
investments in learning are less pronounced than in the case of operating
systems. And because web sites are by and large written to open standards,
the economic incentives of web site producers do not drive the market to-
ward a single browser. On balance, the market may be one conducive to a
dominant firm. The fact that IE and Navigator together have thus far ac-
counted for the great bulk of the browsers in use suggests that the market in
equilibrium would not have many suppliers. So once again, we can assume
that a monopolist might emerge in a browser market devoid of exclusionary
acts.
But what if the wrong monopolist won as a result of Microsoft's preda-
tion? The district court found "that Microsoft has retarded, and perhaps
altogether extinguished," competition from Navigator and Java." 5 The im-
plication is that Navigator might have won the browser monopoly but for
Microsoft's exclusionary actions, and the market is now locked-in to an
inferior standard. This application of the theory of path dependence is not
helpful in designing a remedy.
First, there is no way to determine judicially that Navigator was in fact
superior to IE while IE was gaining market share and Microsoft was at-
tempting to suppress the rival browser, and there would be no way to de-
termine that consumers would be better off in the future if Microsoft were
somehow ordered to cede the market to Netscape. Indeed, some evidence
suggests that the relative market shares of IE and Navigator tracked the
perceived superiority of the products. 6 The court itself concluded that
"there is no consensus [among product evaluations] as to which is the best
browser overall."' 0
7
104 See LIEBOWITZ& MARGOLIS, supra note 101, at 137.
105 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1 411 (emphasis added). Similarly, the court concluded, "Micro-
soft's campaign succeeded in preventing-for several years, and perhaps permanently-Navigator and
Java from fulfilling their potential to open up the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems to
competition on the merits." Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (emphasis added).
106 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at T 195 (alluding to evidence introduced by Microsoft that
browser usage is a function of product innovations); LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 101, at 217-
23.
107 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2dat 195.
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Second, lock-in is not permanent. Empirical studies indicate that
"[g]ood products win."' 18 If Navigator in fact is or becomes a better
browser than IE, it should be able to supplant IE, assuming it is not im-
peded by exclusionary conduct. Consequently, any order now designed to
supplant IE artificially would be inherently punitive.
B. Structural Relief Would Be Ineffective and Would Harm Consumers
In an earlier era, courts sometimes imposed a corporate death sentence
on monopolists, annulling their corporate charters."° Today, divestiture is
the most drastic form of antitrust relief It has been rightly disfavored in
monopolization cases because, except in limited circumstances, it is likely
to do more harm than good."' One study found that, between 1940 and
1974, substantial divestiture was ordered in only four monopolization cases
based solely on exclusionary practices, and the remedy in each of these was
pursuant to a consent decree."' Divestiture makes sense where monopoli-
zation is the result of illegal acquisitions. In such cases, the firms that pre-
ceded the acquisitions presumptively reflect the efficiencies that are avail-
able and can be reestablished relatively easily."2 Divestiture may also make
sense in traditionally regulated industries, where the monopolist has been
able to evade regulation. The existence of administrative regulation implies
that the monopolist must be restrained, and the fact that the restraint was
108 LIEBOWITZ& MARGOLIS, supra note 101,at 135.
109 See People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890), affg 7 N.Y. Supp. 406
(1889); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700 (1890); People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E.
798 (Il1. 1889); California v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 7 RY. & CORP. L.J. 83 (1890); Louisiana v. Am.
Cotton-Oil Trust, I RY. & CORP. L.J. 509 (1887). See generally WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 82 (1965).
110 Detailed examination of remedies ordered in past cases would not be particularly valuable. As
the Court has noted, "[I]n this field, such lines [of precedent] cannot be much more than guides. The
essential consideration is that the remedy shall be as effective and fair as possible in preventing contin-
ued or future violations of the Antitrust Act in the light of the facts of the particular case." United States
v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 335 (1947).
111 POSNER, supra note 100, at 85. Substantial divestiture was ordered in two other exclusionary-
practice cases between 1890 and 1939. Id. When divestiture is the result of a consent decree, rather than
a contested order, the implication may be that the defendant was able to negotiate a breakup that did
minimal or no damage to the fundamental efficiencies inherent in the firm. Such reassurance of the
effect of the decree is lacking when, as in Microsoft, the defendant vigorously opposes the remedy. But
the inference is not conclusive. The defendant may have agreed to a seriously disruptive reorganization
only because the remedy or a worse one appeared to it to be the inevitable result of continued litigation.
One cannot assume, therefore, that the divestitures made pursuant to consent decrees in exclusionary-
practice cases reflect no serious efficiency losses. In any event, the results of divestiture, however
brought about, are disappointing.
112 In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972), the Court noted that "divestiture
is particularly appropriate where asset or stock acquisitions violate the antitrust laws" because it "is a
start toward restoring the pre-acquisition situation." Posner similarly observed, "[D]ivestiture is simpler
to effectuate where the firm to be broken up is itself the product of mergers. The mergers suggest the
lines along which the firm can be broken up with minimal disruption." POSNER, supra note 100, at 84.
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unsuccessful suggests that judicial regulation through a conduct remedy
would be equally ineffectual.' 13 Absent anticompetitive acquisitions and
ineffective regulation, however, divestiture is inappropriate, and predictably
it has produced disappointing results.114 In United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.,115 the Supreme Court ordered dismemberment of a one-
plant monopolist;1"6 the firm deteriorated, the price of shoe machinery in-
creased, and the United States eventually lost its leadership of the
industry.117 The divestiture may not have been responsible for the takeover
by foreign producers, but it surely did nothing to maintain the competitive-
ness of domestic producers.
Two basic kinds of structural remedies were considered in Microsoft.
One would have sought to create immediate competition in the operating
system market by forcing Microsoft to convey the source code for Win-
dows to other firms. We refer to this as a "horizontal" divestiture, because
it creates instant competitors in the relevant operating system market. The
other, a variant of which was adopted by the court, forces Microsoft to
separate its operating system business from its other businesses and spin-
off the segments into independent corporations. We refer to this as a "verti-
cal" divestiture. Both kinds of divestitures have unique advantages and
disadvantages, but neither is appropriate."
8
113 In United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), Judge Harold Greene approved the bulk of an antitrust consent decree that
required in part the divestiture of the Bell operating companies from the rest of AT&T. Though the
divestiture was not imposed by the court on an unwilling defendant, the opinion suggests that the court
would have ordered divestiture in any event. See id. at 160-65. The court emphasized that divestiture,
rather than a conduct remedy, was required because the FCC "is not and never has been capable of
effective enforcement of the laws governing AT&T's behavior." Id. at 168. The court concluded that the
difficulties in effective supervision "would be exacerbated if enforcement of a broad injunction were
vested in court-appointed special masters." Id. That said, it is entirely possible that Judge Greene would
have ordered divestiture regardless of the regulatory environment. He noted, for example, that AT&T
had "a commanding position" in a key industry and declared that "the antitrust laws seek to diffuse
economic power in order to promote the proper functioning of both our economic and political sys-
tems." Id. at 165, 164. Dicta in AT&T might support structural relief in Microsoft. To that extent, we
find the opinion unpersuasive.
114 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 100, at 85 ("The picture that emerges of what antitrust divestiture
has meant in practice is not an edifying one."). For a critical survey of cases in which divestiture was
ordered, see William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the
Sherman Act as a Toolfor Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1105 (1989).
115 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
116 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
117 THOMAS D. MORGAN, MODERN ANTITRUST LAW 297-98 (1994). See also Lino A. Graglia, Is
Antitrust Obsolete?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 17 (1999) ("[T]oday the plant stands boarded and
idle in Belmont, Massachusetts, as a monument to antitrust.").
118 Of course, the two kinds of divestiture could be combined, for instance by ordering the separa-
tion of the operating system component from the applications component and breaking the operating
system component into multiple firms. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 98-1232 (Reme-
dies Brief of Amici Curiae Robert E. Litan et al., Apr. 27, 2000). That kind of remedy simply combines
the advantages and disadvantages discussed in the text.
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1. Horizontal Divestiture
A horizontal divestiture could be accomplished in a number of ways.
Because the essence of Microsoft's monopoly power in operating systems
is intellectual property-the Windows source code-multiple competitors
can be created, and the asset can simultaneously be used by Microsoft. Any
number of rivals, or Microsoft "clones," could be established. The source
code could be auctioned off or given away. The source code could be
placed in the public domain, so that it becomes an open standard. The de-
tails are not critical. What is important is that any horizontal divestiture has
two undesirable consequences.
First, the existence of multiple purveyors of Windows would threaten to
destroy the substantial efficiencies of a dominant operating system stan-
dard. If multiple incompatible operating systems replaced Windows, incre-
mental porting costs could be immense, and consumers might incur sub-
stantial costs in additional training, confusion, and file incompatibility." 9
Indeed, the court implicitly acknowledged that Microsoft achieved its mo-
nopoly in part because of the efficiencies inherent in a common standard.
Some scholars argue that the Microsoft clones will produce operating sys-
tems that are entirely compatible, eliminating any need for porting. 2 ° But
there are strong reasons to believe that if multiple operating system firms
competed with each other through innovation-and innovation rather than
price competition is touted as the chief benefit of a horizontal divestiture-
the operating systems would inevitably diverge. 2' Further, neither Unix nor
Linux, two existing alternative operating systems, has developed versions
that are fully compatible, despite the network effects that would supposedly
prevent the Windows platform from fragmenting.12 A remedy that would
risk serious fragmentation based on speculation that compatibility would
prevail is unjustified unless every other potential remedy is demonstrably
and dramatically inferior. That is not the case here.
Second, any horizontal divestiture would deprive Microsoft of much of
119 Stan Liebowitz estimated that the porting costs for software developers associated with a
breakup of Windows into three competing operating systems would be at least $30 billion dollars over a
three-year period, and he did not attempt to quantify the other costs. Stan J. Liebowitz, Breaking Win-
dows: Estimating the Cost of Breaking up Microsoft Windows, 32 U.W.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming
2001).
120 See, e.g., Robert J. Levinson, R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop, The Flawed Fragmenta-
tion Critique of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case (Jan. 20, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=425418&cftoken=49765609&abstractid=204874; Tho-
mas M. Lenard, Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: Alternative Structural
Remedies in the Microsoft Case. 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803 (2001).
121 See Stan J. Liebowitz, A Fool's Paradise: The Windows World After a Forced Breakup of
Microsoft 1, 5-11 (Feb. 25, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, presented by Ass'n for Competitive Tech-
nology) at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?cfid=425002&cftoken=90302362&abstract-id =
218178.
122 See Liebowitz, A Fool's Paradise, supra note 121, at 11-14.
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the value of the monopoly it lawfully acquired. How much of the value that
would be lost would depend on the mechanism used to effectuate the
breakup. But to whatever extent that is, the remedy would dampen the in-
centives of future innovators by making the rewards from success risky,
and it would represent a punitive decree. The court held only that Microsoft
impeded the development of two immature technologies, both beset by
their own technical shortcomings, that might someday have undermined its
monopoly power in operating systems. Dismantling Microsoft is in no
sense proportionate to that offense.
The advantages of a horizontal divestiture depend upon the reference
point. Such a divestiture might entail less continuing judicial supervision
than a conduct decree, though it would not be self-enforcing. Microsoft
presumably would no longer have market power, and so it would have less
ability to impair competition. But it would remain intact as a firm, and pre-
sumably would have the same corporate managers and ambitions. At least
in the early stages of the newly-structured industry, the court likely would
not be comfortable allowing Microsoft to compete freely. Further, any at-
tempt to prevent operating system fragmentation by judicial control would
imply continuing supervision.
Relative to a vertical breakup, to which we turn next, an advantage of a
horizontal divestiture is that it would allow the firm to remain intact. Those
intensely suspicious of Microsoft might view that as a disadvantage, of
course. But as we discuss next, the efficiencies associated with a vertically-
integrated firn are huge. A horizontal breakup would avoid the need to
undertake a cumbersome and arbitrary division of assets. And it would
avoid creating the potential for double-marginalization from successive
monopolies. Because we believe a conduct remedy is far superior to any
structural decree, we need not decide which form of divestiture is worse.
2. Vertical Divestiture
The kind of vertical divestiture ordered by the court is not the only one
imaginable. For instance, an amicus brief submitted by Microsoft's com-
petitors urged the court to create three firms, one for the operating system,
one for the browser, and one for applications. 23 To focus the analysis, we
address the vertical divestiture ordered by the court, which separates Mi-
crosoft's operating systems business from everything else and prohibits the
two resultant firms from having much to do with one another. In particular,
the OpCo is expected to market and develop new versions of Windows
123 Brief on Remedy of Amici Curiae Computer and Comm. Ind. Ass'n and Software and Infor-
mation Ind. Ass'n, at http://eon.law.harvard.edumsdoj/amicus5-19-OO.htm. The government reportedly
offered its own form of a three-firm divestiture as its first settlement proposal during unsuccessful
mediation talks. AULETTA, supra note 92, at 341.
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operating systems without IE, and the AppCo is expected to market and
develop IE and Office. This division would certainly impose substantial
costs, and it is unlikely to foster competition.
Costs of the court's divestiture plan. The divestiture is apt to reduce
both productive and allocative efficiency. One indication that an organiza-
tion is productively efficient is that firms without monopoly power choose
it. Many software firms in the industry are vertically integrated, perhaps
more so than Microsoft. This is not surprising because the production of
complementary software through an integrated enterprise generates obvious
efficiencies. Research and development is not likely to fall neatly into ei-
ther the operating system or the applications category, and so at best, the
decree threatens to result in needless duplication. Human capital will in-
evitably be squandered as personnel with broad expertise are forced into
one part of the business or the other.
Vertical divestiture is also likely to result in higher prices from reduced
allocative efficiency. The foundation of liability is that Microsoft has a mo-
nopoly in operating systems and nearly has one in browsers. By dividing
the monopolies between two firms, the decree introduces the risk of double-
marginalization. The firms may independently pursue profit maximization,
and that would lead to higher prices for the products licensed separately
than would be charged for the products licensed by a single firm.124 A dis-
tinct but related concern is that Microsoft apparently was not pursuing a
strategy of exploiting the monopoly power it has by charging high prices.
The empirical evidence indicates that Microsoft has deliberately pursued a
low-price strategy in the sale of its products generally 125 and that the price
of Windows specifically has been well below the short-run profit maxi-
mizing monopoly price.'26 If one or both of the derivative firms adopted a
conventional profit maximizing strategy for its products, as at least one
would likely do, the resulting increase in the costs to consumers could be
dramatic. 127
Further, if vertical restructuring is truly responsive to the theory of li-
ability, then one should expect the OpCo to be prevented from producing
an operating system that contains a built-in browser or other middleware.
To that extent, consumers would be denied the benefits of acquiring in a
single transaction a relatively full-featured operating system, one that con-
tains all of the functionality desired. This represents a lost efficiency of
124 See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 31-35 (1983).
125 See LIEBOWITZ& MARGOLIS, supra note 101, at 163-233.
126 See Stan J. Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig in a Poke: Estimating the Cost of the District Court's
Proposed Breakup of Microsoft, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 727 (2001).
127 See id. at 730-44 (estimating an increase of $38 billion in the cost of operating systems and $14
billion in the cost of applications to U.S. consumers over a three-year period, based on stipulated as-
sumptions).
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product configuration. In fact, it is not altogether clear what the decree
contemplates. Once the reorganization plan has been implemented and
three years have passed, it might not prevent the OpCo from licensing a
browser from a firm other than the AppCo But if this is so, and if after three
years the OpCo has not lost its monopoly power, it could presumably at-
tempt to replicate the strategy for which Microsoft was condemned. The
divestiture would have accomplished nothing.
The breakup ordered by the court also poses unexamined corporate fi-
nance problems. Under the decree, large shareholders, those who own five
percent or more of the voting stock of Microsoft, who are also present or
former employees, officers, or directors of the company cannot own stock
in both the OpCo and the AppCo128 The intent apparently is to prevent in-
dividuals especially responsible for Microsoft's success from having the
ability to influence the conduct of both resultant firms. But Lucian Bebchuk
and David Walker argue that any method of distributing the securities in the
resultant firms that complied with the order would impose a significant and
unintended financial penalty on the large shareholders or create a risk of a
substantial transfer of value among Microsoft's shareholders. 2 9 They con-
tend that there is no simple solution to the finance issues posed by the di-
vestiture. Resolving these issues may be costly.
The decree is also likely to involve significant costs of supervision.
Without question, the court did not view its structural remedy as self-
effectuating. The decree imposes a confusing set of restrictions on the
dealings between the OpCo and the AppCo that remain in effect for the
duration of the final judgment. 3 ' For example, the order prohibits the two
firms, having been separated from each other, from thereafter merging, and
the need for this restraint is obvious enough. But the court also imposes
restrictions on licensing intellectual property to one another that can chari-
tably be described as cumbersome. These are likely to require subsequent
judicial interpretation.
Purported benefits of the court's divestiture plan. Although the decree
will likely involve substantial direct costs of enforcement and increase
prices to consumers in the short term, its proponents apparently believe that
these costs will be outweighed by a long-term increase in competition in
the platform market. The government argued, for example, that Microsoft's
Office could develop into a platform competitor of Windows by exposing
APIs and that existing alternative operating systems, in particular Linux,
could become serious competitors to Windows if Office were ported to
128 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64-65 (decree §§ l(c)(iii), 2(a)), 71-72 (decree § 7(h), defining
"covered shareholder").
129 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & David I. Walker, The Overlooked Corporate Finance Problems of a
Microsoft Breakup (Jan. 2001, unpublished manuscript), at http://papers.nber. org/papers/W8089.
130 See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (decree § 2(b)).
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them. According to the government, neither form of competition was likely
to evolve unless the ownership of Office was severed from the ownership
of Windows, because Microsoft now has no incentive to transform Office
into a platform competitor or allow it to strengthen the market position of a
rival.
But the government's argument is both unconvincing and inconsistent
with its theory of liability. Firms other than Microsoft have sold applica-
tions programs as basic and dominant in their categories as Office, and
none has attempted to turn one into a rival applications platform.13' The
idea that the vendor of Office would pursue a platform strategy is specula-
tive. The record also belies the claim that Office would be ported to and
markedly strengthen other operating systems.' The applications entry bar-
rier exists because it does not make economic sense for ISVs to port appli-
cations to relatively unpopular operating systems. That condition would not
change simply because a separate company owns Office. The government
seems to believe that Microsoft has not ported Office to Linux solely for
exclusionary reasons. But Microsoft has ported Office to the Macintosh,
which the court found is the second most popular software platform. Mi-
crosoft's porting decisions seem to be driven by the same cost/benefit cal-
culus that any other software developer uses. The fact that Corel, a firm in
dire financial trouble that recently struck up an alliance with Microsoft, has
ported WordPerfect to Linux most likely proves only that a struggling firm
will assess the marginal costs and marginal benefits of porting differently,
perhaps adopting a strategy that a healthy firm would deem too risky.'33
In addition, the availability of Office would not likely have an apprecia-
ble impact on the popularity of Linux. The court found that Microsoft's
monopoly power is protected by an entry barrier built of 70,000134 applica-
tions and that the next most popular operating system supports 12,000 ap-
plications. The addition of one application, however popular, written to a
little-used operating system is not likely to provide a large boost in demand.
Indeed, the fact that Office was ported to the Macintosh was apparently not
enough to turn that operating system into a serious competitor to Windows.
Moreover, the claim that a single applications suite could turn a rival oper-
ating system into a viable substitute in consumption is entirely at odds with
the government's fundamental argument that Microsoft's monopoly is
protected by an insurmountable applications entry barrier. One suite of ap-
131 See Liebowitz, Pig in a Poke, supra note 126, at 743.
132 See id. at 743-46.
133 See Rebecca Buckman & Joel Baglole, Microsoft to Invest $135 Million in Corel, WALL. ST.
J., Oct. 3, 2000, at B10.
134 This figure appears to be an exaggeration. One study found that the overwhelming majority of
these never existed, no longer exist, or are out of date. See Richard McKenzie, Microsoft's "Applica-
tions Barrier to Entry": The Missing 70,000 Programs, (Aug. 31, 2000) (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis
No. 380), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-380es.html.
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plications is not an imposing obstacle to entry. In theory, the AppCo could
develop IE itself into a rival platform to Windows. But again, the possibil-
ity is highly speculative, and the history of other potential platforms offers
little reason for optimism.
Further, if the platform market is subject to network effects and related
conditions, a dominant product is likely to emerge, whether in the form of
Office, a browser, or some other application program. To replace a domi-
nant Windows with a dominant alternative platform would do nothing more
than substitute one monopolist for another, which suggests that the gov-
ernment is less concerned about the existence of a monopolist than with its
identity. And, given the decree's legal restrictions on Windows, the victor
in such a struggle would not necessarily be a better platform.
The process by which the decree was formulated casts substantial doubt
on the weight to be given the government's predictions of competitive
benefit. The court conceded that no one knows what effect the decree will
have. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the government is entitled to
complete deference in the framing of the decree. The court entered the final
judgment proposed by the plaintiffs unexpectedly, without substantive
change, and without affording Microsoft an opportunity to contest the fac-
tual issues posed by the decree. 135 The decree pertained to products like
Windows CE and Windows 2000, even though little evidence about them
was introduced at trial. The Office software suite was critical to the theory
of the breakup plan, as discussed above, yet it was virtually ignored at trial.
Microsoft was not permitted to depose the experts who submitted declara-
tions in support of the government's proposal, and it was not given time to
introduce the declarations of its own experts, though it did make an offer of
proof.
The court brushed aside Microsoft's protests. It found that Microsoft's
"profession of surprise is not credible.' ' 136 It even suggested that antitrust
defendants have no right to contest the remedy proposed. 137 And, astonish-
ingly, it declared,
Plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason alone have some entitlement to a remedy of their
choice. Moreover, plaintiffs' proposed final judgment is the collective work product of [fed-
eral and state officials and their consultants]. These officials are by reason of office obliged
135 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000).
136 Id.at6l.
137 "[A]re you aware of very many cases in which the defendant can argue with the jury about
what an appropriate sanction should be? Were the Japanese allowed to propose the terms of their sur-
render? The government won the case." Wilke, supra note 87 (quoting Judge Jackson). In a similar
vein, Judge Jackson compared Microsoft's "proclamations of innocence to those of four members of the
Newton Street Crew convicted in a racketeering, drug dealing, and murder trial he had presided over
five years before." AULEIrA, supra note 92, at 369.
[VOL. 9:3
DEVISING A MICROSOFT REMEDY
and expected to consider-and to act-in the public interest; Microsoft is not.
13 8
What the court appeared to endorse, therefore, was a nearly ex parte
process of remedy design that was all but certain to produce an extreme
result. While the government officials in this case are undoubtedly well
intentioned, they are in the end partisans in hotly contested litigation.139 To
defer to them, without subjecting their proposals to hard scrutiny through
the adversarial process, invites a reckless decree.
III. CRAFTING AN APPROPRIATE CONDUCT DECREE
Just as in the case of choosing between structural and conduct relief,
the objective in determining the content of a conduct remedy is to minimize
the sum of the relevant expected social costs. In this section, we sketch the
elements of an appropriate order, one tailored to the conduct found unlaw-
ful after trial. In so doing, we assess the provisions of the final judgment
designed to restrict and mandate conduct before and during the first three
years after the breakup of Microsoft. This represents the court's attempt to
suppress Microsoft's anticompetitive behavior through a conduct-based
order, albeit one intended to be temporary, and it serves as a useful focal
point for an appropriate permanent decree of this kind. Our goal, however,
is not to draft a model decree. Rather, we focus on the kinds of provisions
that are necessary to redress the anticompetitive practices identified by the
court.
In general, the provisions should reflect the products that were at issue
in the trial. In particular, this case concerned efforts to protect the monop-
oly power associated with versions of the Windows operating system for
Intel-compatible personal computers. Any conduct order should cover suc-
cessor versions of Windows for personal computers. Because generations
of PC operating systems are brief, a decree would accomplish little unless it
applied to successor versions. But operating systems designed by Microsoft
for servers and other computing devices should be affected, if at all, only
tangentially. Similarly, Microsoft was found to have suppressed competi-
tion from a rival browser and the Java technology, largely by the anticom-
138 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63 (footnote omitted).
139 In fact, the suggestion that public officials, especially state officials, can be counted on in
antitrust enforcement to serve the public interest is quaint. Judge Richard A. Posner, who was the court-
appointed mediator in unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a settlement in Microsoft, see John R. Wilke,
Microsoft Judge Names Mediator to Seek Accord, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A3, recently sug-
gested that states be "stripped of their authority to bring antitrust suits, federal or state, except under
circumstances in which a private firm would be able to sue" in part because "they are too subject to
influence by interest groups that may represent a potential antitrust defendant's competitors." Richard
A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001). Judge Posner reportedly
was outraged by the behavior of the states in the settlement negotiations. See AULETTA, supra note 92,
at 360.
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petitive use of its own browser. The decree should focus on these products,
rather than other kinds of software that could function as platforms.
A. Bundling the Operating System and Browser
The contractual and technological bundling of Windows and IE was a
major part of the court's liability determination. In this context, bundling
means that Microsoft packaged Windows and IE and prevented OEMs that
licensed Windows from removing any part of IE.14° The vice of this prac-
tice was to give IE a competitive advantage over Navigator. Today, the
relevant method of bundling is technological, 4 ' and so a remedy should
prevent Microsoft from gaining a competitive advantage in attracting
browser usage through the technological combination of IE and Windows.
The order, therefore, might require Microsoft to permit OEMs to preinstall
a version of Windows in which the means end-users employ to invoke IE
for web browsing are removed or hidden. For example, Microsoft would be
forced to allow OEMs to delete the IE icon from the desktop. If an OEM
preferred to configure Windows so that the end-user had the option of re-
moving end-user access to IE, Microsoft should be required to facilitate that
preference as well. Microsoft should be allowed to contract with OEMs to
offer, at the same price, a version of Windows in which end-user access to
IE is not encumbered.
The technological bundling provision of the court's decree is too broad
in a number of respects. First, the provision applies to the bundling of any
"middleware product" to Windows, and the term is defined to include much
more than browsers. 42 To that extent, it goes beyond the offense estab-
lished at trial, and it exceeds the limits of any legitimate fencing-in objec-
tive. It also exacerbates the potential for platform fragmentation, as we ex-
plain below.
The provision allows Microsoft to offer Windows much as it does now,
with its own middleware product included, but only if it also (1) offers an
"otherwise identical version" of the operating system in which end-user
140 For one attempt to distinguish among tying, packaging, and bundling, see Benjamin Klein,
Microsoft's Use of Zero Price Bundling to Fight the "Browser Wars, " in COMPETITION, INNOVATION
AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE (Jeffrey A. Eisenach &
Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
141 The decree contains a provision prohibiting the contractual tying of Windows to "any other
Microsoft software product that Microsoft distributes separately ...." Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68
(decree § 3(f)("Bar on Contractual Tying")). Such a provision is appropriate, even if contractual tying is
no longer an area of great concern.
142 See supra note 77. Middleware is any software that exposes APIs and that "could" allow appli-
cations written to those APIs to run on any operating system. A "middleware product" is middleware
that Microsoft has distributed separately from the operating system; it is defined to include the browser,
email, multimedia viewing, instant messaging, and voice recognition software. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp.
2d at 72 (decree § 7(g)).
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access to that product can be easily removed and (2) charges a lower roy-
alty for the modified version.143 The principal defect of this provision is that
it invites fragmentation of the Windows standard. If Microsoft licenses a
version of Windows that contains all of the middleware functionality that a
current version contains, it must offer versions that are designed so that
OEMs can easily delete end-user access to any middleware product. Be-
cause the definition of "middleware product" is both broad and vague,
OEMs may install a variety of Windows operating systems with varying
functionality. One commentator likens the effect of the provision to order-
ing a meal in a restaurant where every item on the menu is At la carte.1"
Whether Windows as a software platform becomes fragmented depends
on whether Microsoft complies with the provision by simply facilitating the
removal of end-user access to the middleware product, and leaving the un-
derlying code otherwise intact and accessible to ISVs. If the code remains
accessible, the ISVs can write programs with the expectation that all of the
functionality contained in the full version of Windows is available, even if
end users cannot access some of that functionality. No fragmentation of the
platform standard results. Further, to the extent that the middleware prod-
uct, such as the browser, is integrated into Windows, it shares code with the
operating system, and Microsoft could not delete that code without break-
ing the operating system, a result it would avoid.
But Microsoft may be able to configure the operating system to pre-
clude ISV access to the functionality that the OEM did not want and still
comply with the decree, such as by eliminating APIs. And Microsoft, be-
cause of the pricing provision, might have an incentive to do just that. Any
OEM is entitled to a discount for every middleware product it chooses to
disable. If rejecting middleware components does not compromise the per-
formance of the operating system as a platform, the OEM may well choose
as few components as possible, perhaps none, thereby entitling it to the
143 The provision in full is as follows:
Restriction on Binding Middleware Products to Operating System Products. Micro-
soft shall not, in any Operating System Product distributed six or more months after
the effective date of this Final Judgment, Bind and Middleware Product to a Win-
dows Operating System unless:
i. Microsoft also offers an otherwise identical version of that Operating System
Product in which all means of End-User Access to that Middleware Product can
readily be removed (a) by OEMs as part of standard OEM preinstallation kits and
(b) by end users using add-remove utilities readily accessible in the initial boot
process and from the Windows desktop; and
ii. when an OEM removes End-User Access to a Middleware Product from any Per-
sonal Computer on which Windows is preinstalled, the royalty paid by that OEM
for that copy of Windows is reduced in an amount not less than the product of the
otherwise applicable royalty and the ratio of the number of amount in bytes of bi-
nary code of (a) the Middleware Product as distributed separately from a Windows
Operating System Product to (b) the applicable version of Windows.
Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (decree § 3(g)).
144 See Liebowitz, Pig in a Poke, supra note 126, at 748.
2001]
GEO. MASON L. REV.
lowest price. In order to induce OEMs to pay for components they are in
fact receiving, though in disabled form, Microsoft may attempt to prevent
those components from being available for ISVs. Fragmentation of the
standard would then result.
ISVs can, of course, include in their programs the Microsoft libraries
that would otherwise be provided by the operating system. But to the extent
that those libraries are resident on the operating system but rendered un-
available to the ISVs, this response results in needless duplication. Further,
whether or not that functionality remains resident, this response involves a
significantly less efficient method of providing system services. Instead of
providing code for a particular function once and making it generally avail-
able, all programs needing that function will have to contain the code.
Even if Microsoft avoids the fragmentation pitfall, because it either
cannot or does not want to make middleware products unavailable to ISVs,
the provision is likely to have undesirable consequences. The pricing provi-
sion requires a discount, but it does not set the baseline price of the operat-
ing system that contains the relevant middleware product. At the limit, if
Microsoft anticipates that all OEMs will choose the least equipped version
of Windows in order to receive the lowest price, it can increase the price for
the full version of Windows by an amount equal to the expected discounts.
If OEMs then pay alternative providers for their middleware products, the
price to end-users of an operating system that contains middleware would
increase. Of course, Microsoft's pricing problem is more complicated than
suggested by this polar example. The demand for middleware functionality
is likely to vary across products and OEMs, and the increase in the effective
price of full functionality may reduce the quantity of Windows sold. What
is critical is that the effects of this provision are uncertain and potentially
costly.
In addition, the pricing formula itself is comically arbitrary. The dis-
count that Microsoft must offer for versions of Windows in which end-user
access to middleware products has been removed by the OEM bears no
principled relation to the marginal cost of the product. Rather, Microsoft
must discount the royalty on the basis of "the ratio of the number of amount
in bytes of binary code of (a) the Middleware Product as distributed sepa-
rately from a Windows Operating System Product to (b) the applicable ver-
sion of Windows."' 45 The value of software has little to do with the number
of bytes in its code. It is as if a restaurant with an a la carte menu set prices
according to the weight of the food, charging more for a potato than for a
souffle.
To be fair, it is not clear what pricing formula could be specified that
would be both accurate and administrable. This is particularly true because
145 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
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the most important middleware product, the browser, can generate revenue
for the supplier from ancillary sources, such as web advertisers. The
browser may thus have a negative marginal cost. As a matter of economic
theory, if Microsoft were ordered to provide a version of Windows with IE
disabled, it ought to be allowed to charge a higher price than for a version
that is IE-enabled, one that reflects the lost supplementary income.'46
Nevertheless, if Microsoft chose to offer a version of Windows that
contained only end-user accessible Microsoft middleware, we would allow
Microsoft to satisfy its anti-bundling obligation by licensing stripped-down
versions at no higher royalty rates. This case was never about an "eco-
nomic" tie, in the sense that OEMs refused to pay for Navigator because
they had already "purchased" IE in the price of Windows; the browser is
free in all channels of distribution. OEMs were consequently willing to
delete end-user access to IE and install Navigator instead. If Microsoft is
restrained from insisting that IE remain accessible on Windows, OEMs so
inclined will not be deterred from substituting other browsers.
Under this arrangement, a rival supplier can pay OEMs to make its
browser the only one accessible on Windows, something it may well do
especially if the marginal cost of the browser is negative. Microsoft, by
contrast, would be foreclosed from competing through price to induce
OEMs to retain IE, either exclusively or in addition to the rival browser.
Preventing that kind of competition cannot easily be reconciled with eco-
nomic theory, and it does not bode well for consumers. But we see little
choice. If Microsoft could charge more for the stripped-down version than
for the full version, it could set prices strategically to make the stripped-
down version uneconomical for all OEMs, thereby shutting out competi-
tors, and we see no workable price standard that could force Microsoft to
set prices equal to marginal cost. In the end, the kind of pricing restraint we
are describing will hamper Microsoft and could injure consumers, but those
are consequences of the liability determination.
Finally, Microsoft should in any event be permitted to label and config-
ure its products in such a way as to minimize the risk of fragmentation
through the action of end-users. For example, if the decree results in Micro-
soft licensing to an OEM a version of Windows from which middleware
functionality has been removed, it ought to be able to insist that end-users
be apprised of what they are receiving. Microsoft might designate stripped-
down versions of its operating system "Windows" and the fully-loaded
version "Windows Gold." There is no justification for preventing Microsoft
from generating demand for its middleware by conveying information to
end-users. Whether this practice would be permitted under the decree
would depend on whether versions of Windows with different trademarks
146 See Klein, supra note 140.
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are nevertheless "otherwise identical," and that is not clear. Similarly, Mi-
crosoft ought to be allowed to include links in its stripped-down versions
that would allow the end-user easily to download middleware that the OEM
has opted to disable. Facilitating consumer choice in this manner does not
subvert the legitimate purposes of the decree.
B. Screen and Sequence Restrictions
To some extent, Microsoft's refusal to allow OEMs to modify the Win-
dows desktop reinforced its bundling of IE and Windows, and the remedial
provisions discussed above will address that practice. But its restrictions on
screen modifications as well as on changes to the boot sequence were inde-
pendently significant in preventing OEMs from promoting Navigator. We
would simply compel Microsoft to allow OEMs to modify the Windows
desktop and boot sequence to encourage the use of non-Microsoft middle-
ware products, including by making a rival product the default browser, so
long as the changes do not impair core operating system functions. The
court's decree is basically consistent with this remedial objective. 147
C. OEM Inducements to Favor 1E
The court found that Microsoft induced OEMs to favor IE over Navi-
gator by the use of both positive and negative incentives, particularly by
offering large-volume OEMs royalty reductions for making IE the default
browser or not preinstalling Navigator at all.148 Consistent with our analysis
of the bundling provision, Microsoft has to be restrained from offering
OEMs a lower royalty solely in exchange for a commitment to pre-install a
version of Windows that promotes IE usage instead of one that does not.
The injunction should be more general, prohibiting the provision of other
kinds of benefits for the same purpose. It should also prevent Microsoft
from imposing any sanction on an OEM for encouraging the use of non-
Microsoft middleware, such as refusing to supply Windows to an OEM that
substitutes Navigator for IE.
The decree addresses these concerns primarily in two provisions, one
banning any adverse action against an OEM for supporting non-Microsoft
products, 149 and one requiring Microsoft to license Windows to the twenty
largest OEMs pursuant to uniform license agreements.15° The decree, how-
147 See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 66-67 (§ 3(a)).
148 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 230-31 (D.D.C. 1999).
149 See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (§ 3(a)(i)) (providing that Microsoft may not take or
threaten adverse action against any OEM based on action by that OEM "to use, distribute promote,
license, develop, or sell any product or service that competes with any Microsoft product or service").
150 Id. (§ 3(a)(ii)) (requiring Microsoft to license Windows to "Covered OEMs," defined in § 7(g)
as the largest 20, "pursuant to uniform license agreements with uniform terms and conditions").
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ever, permits Microsoft to specify reasonable volume discounts in licensing
agreements with the large OEMs, and it allows Microsoft to provide valu-
able technical information selectively if the information pertains to a confi-
dential aspect of a bona fide joint development effort with the OEM. 15I The
provisions generally are appropriate, though they do not go far enough in
preserving the opportunity for productive joint ventures between Microsoft
and individual OEMs. This kind of collaboration can yield significant con-
sumer benefits, and it will likely be deterred unless Microsoft can offer
royalty concessions to OEMs that participate in bona fide joint develop-
ment efforts. One might argue that a provision permitting royalty reduc-
tions for legitimate efforts would be too costly to enforce. Though the con-
cern is valid, it is not great enough to justify the uniformity requirement.
Microsoft should be allowed to offer royalty concessions to OEMs, re-
gardless of size, that participate in joint efforts to develop Windows.
D. Transactions with lAPs
Another major element in the court's liability determination is that Mi-
crosoft induced APs to distribute IE rather than Navigator to their sub-
scribers. A responsive provision would enjoin Microsoft from offering
anything of value, including a link in the Windows desktop to the lAP and
monetary inducements, in exchange for the lAP's commitment not to dis-
tribute or promote a rival product. The form of the inducement does not
matter. Such a prohibition would encompass the purchase of preferential
treatment for IE, and it would eliminate the provision of benefits to an lAP
for agreeing explicitly to limit the units of Navigator or any other browser
distributed. Any specific provision has to make clear that a contract under
which an lAP agrees to distribute IE does not constitute a prohibited com-
mitment, given that the distribution of IE to a subscriber has the practical
effect of foreclosing the provision of some other browser to that subscriber.
Similarly, Microsoft should not be prohibited from providing assistance,
such as in the form of free access kits, to IAPs that choose to distribute IE.
Section 3(e) of the decree prohibits Microsoft from entering into agree-
ments with any third party, including an lAP, under which the third party
agrees to "restrict its development, production, distribution, promotion or
use of, or payment for, any non-Microsoft Platform Software," "distribute,
promote or use any Microsoft Platform Software exclusively," or "degrade
the performance of any non-Microsoft Platform Software." 15 2 It also pro-
hibits agreements with lAPs and ICPs under which they promise to "dis-
tribute, promote or use Microsoft software in exchange for placement with
151 Id.
152 Id. at 68 (§ 3(e)).
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respect to any aspect of a Windows Operating System Product."' 53 The
provisions, though unnecessarily cumbersome, are generally proper, with
one exception. As suggested above, Microsoft should not be prohibited
from entering into a contract with an IAP under which the lAP distributes
IE, so long as the lAP makes no additional commitment not to distribute
competing software. It should not matter what positive inducement Micro-
soft offers the lAP, whether a direct payment or some other benefit, such as
placement on the desktop. The provision should not prohibit these transac-
tions.
E. Exclusionary Arrangements Pertaining to IHVs, ICPs, and ISVs
The court found that Microsoft supplemented its efforts to inhibit the
distribution of Navigator through its dealings with Apple, ICPs, and
ISVs.'5 4 Microsoft should be enjoined from conditioning the production of
any of its software for use in conjunction with an IHV's products on the
IHV's agreement not to use or to disfavor non-Microsoft platform software.
Microsoft should be prohibited from demanding that an IHV abandon its
own efforts to develop competing software as a condition of supplying
compatible software. Agreements with ICPs to promote IE rather than
Navigator and to configure their web sites to favor access through IE were
not a major part of the case against Microsoft. Any injunction should
merely prohibit exclusive promotional arrangements with ICPs and com-
mitments by ICPs to take affirmative steps solely to denigrate the quality of
their sites when accessed through a rival browser. Similarly, Microsoft
should be prohibited from providing positive or negative inducements to
ISVs for their agreement not to develop products for rival platforms.
Further, the most direct way for Microsoft to injure a rival middleware
producer is to configure Windows so that the non-Windows software will
not operate on it, or to deny the producer the information necessary to en-
able the middleware to function. Microsoft should be enjoined from pur-
posely impairing the ability of rival middleware to run on Windows and
should be required to provide rival middleware producers the information
they need to ensure that the products function together smoothly.
The decree addresses some of these concerns in section 3(e), discussed
above, which bans "exclusive dealing." Section 3(d) appears to prohibit
Microsoft from taking or threatening action to induce an ISV or IHV not to
develop or use software that runs on a rival product or that competes with a
Microsoft product.'55 The thrust of the provision is appropriate, but it is
awkwardly drafted and overly broad. Section 3(c), by contrast, is well-
153 Id.
154 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 139 (D.D.C. 1999).
155 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 67-68 (§ 3(d)).
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drafted, prohibiting any action that Microsoft "knows will interfere with or
degrade the performance of any non-Microsoft Middleware when in-
teroperating with any Windows Operating System Product without notify-
ing the supplier" of the impending action and ways to avoid product failure
or quality degradation. 5 6 The requirement of prior notice, though not es-
sential, is a reasonable measure.
Section 3(b) requires Microsoft to disclose to ISVs, IHVs, and OEMs
all APIs, technical information, and communications interfaces that Micro-
soft uses to enable its own applications and middleware to interoperate with
other platform software.157 The first problem is that the provision also per-
tains to information on the interoperation of personal computer platform
software and operating systems for servers and handheld devices. To that
extent, the provision exceeds proper bounds. More importantly, "[t]o fa-
cilitate compliance, and monitoring of compliance" with the primary dis-
closure obligations, the provision requires Microsoft to provide OEMs,
ISVs, and IHVs access to a secure facility in which they can "study, inter-
rogate and interact with relevant and necessary portions of the source code
and any related documentation of Microsoft Platform Software for the sole
purpose of enabling their products to interoperate effectively with Micro-
soft Platform Software .. ..*",58 Certainly, steps reasonably calculated to
facilitate compliance with basic obligations are themselves appropriate. But
this requirement is patently excessive. It compels Microsoft to disclose the
intellectual property that is fundamental to its business to its competitors,
while offering it protection from misappropriation only by admonishing
those competitors that they may use the information solely to enable inter-
operation. This is not a reasonable compliance measure.
The court found that Microsoft raises the royalty rate on a given version
of Windows when it releases a new version, thereby encouraging OEMs to
preinstall only the current version. 59 The decree requires Microsoft to con-
tinue offering to license any version of Windows on the same terms and
conditions for three years after a major new release. 60 The rationale for the
provision is obscure. First, the government asserts that it will encourage
Microsoft to innovate because, unless a new version of Windows is sub-
stantially better than the old, consumers will refuse to pay a higher price for
the new version. 61 But forcing a monopolist to compete against itself is not
a proper objective of a remedy, and in any event, the evidence suggested
156 Id. at 67 (§ 3(b)(iii)).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 57 (D.D.C. 1999).
160 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69 (§ 3(i)).
161 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 98-1232, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of
Proposed Final Judgment (Public Redacted Version) 28 (filed Apr. 29, 2000); Declaration of Carl Sha-
piro 25-26 (filed Apr. 28, 2000) at http://usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4600/4642.pdf.
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that Microsoft was an aggressive innovator. Besides, if Microsoft is a mo-
nopolist, its profit maximizing price is a function of demand, and if it is
charging the monopoly price, it could not profitably charge more for a new
version than for the predecessor unless the new version was an improve-
ment. The implicit strategy posited by the government-force consumers to
pay more for a new product that is no better than the old by raising the price
of the old product-is nonsensical.
The government also contends that the provision will encourage inno-
vation by independent middleware developers by assuring them that any
Windows platform to which they write will remain available for three years
after release of a new platform.162 Though the provision in theory could
lower the expected cost of writing middleware by reducing the risk that the
middleware would have to be ported to another incarnation of an operating
system, no evidence at trial indicated that middleware producers were de-
terred by this prospect. The cost may have been insignificant. In a similar
vein, the government claims that, if the new version of Windows incorpo-
rates functionality offered by the middleware, the middleware vendor will
be able to continue marketing its product for use in conjunction with the old
version, again increasing the expected return to middleware development.
But it is difficult to see a need for this kind of protection when the decree
elsewhere prohibits the very bundling that supposedly justifies this provi-
sion.
Finally, the government claims that the provision "should make it more
difficult for Microsoft to use its Windows monopoly power to gain control
over adjacent markets: if a new version of Windows favors Microsoft's
complementary products, OEMs and consumers will at least have the
choice to use the predecessor version, perhaps in conjunction with non-
Microsoft complementary products." '163 But again, there was no evidence
that Microsoft prevented competing applications from running on Win-
dows, and the decree elsewhere purports to assure interoperability. At best,
this provision is a cure in search of a disease. It should be deleted."6
F. Undermining Java
The court found that Microsoft suppressed the Java middleware threat
in a number of ways, such as by impeding the distribution of Navigator,' 65
162 Declaration of Carl Shapiro 25 (filed Apr. 28, 2000) at http://usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f4600/4642.pdf.
163 Id. at 26.
164 Even though we find no justification for the provision, Microsoft itself proposed an equivalent
restriction. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 98-1232, Microsoft Corporation's Proposed
Final Judgment § 8 (filed May 10, 2000), at http://news.findlaw.comilegalnews/lit/microsoft. The ex-
planation may be that Microsoft believed its past practice had no appreciable impact.
165 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 90-92 (D.D.C. 1999).
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and some of these are addressed above. But the court also found that Mi-
crosoft hijacked Java in part by creating a unique Java implementation for
Windows and then inducing ISVs to write to it."6 This undermined the
cross-platform capacity of the Java technology. A responsive remedy would
prohibit Microsoft from incorporating any Java technology in Windows
that is incompatible with the standard Java implementation without the
consent of Java's owner. Such a restriction would not necessarily benefit
consumers. It could reduce Microsoft's incentive to improve the technology
because it could force Microsoft to share the rewards from innovation,
though this effect might be mitigated by the possibility of an agreement
between Microsoft and Java's owner. The court's suggestion that it was
anticompetitive to induce ISVs to use the Microsoft implementation by
making it technically superior is perverse. But Microsoft's practice was
condemned, and this kind of remedy is simple and effective. The court's
decree contains no specific provision addressing this practice. Presumably
the government and the court believe that it is covered by more general
mandates. In particular, "middleware" is defined to include the Java Virtual
Machine.167 Section 3(c) of the decree prohibits Microsoft from taking "any
action that it knows will interfere with or degrade" the middleware's per-
formance when interoperating with Windows unless Microsoft informs the
supplier of ways to avoid or reduce the problem. 1
68
G. Market Division Agreements
The court found that Microsoft attempted to reach an agreement with
Netscape to divide the browser market by offering valuable consideration if
Netscape assented and threatening adverse consequences if it refused. 169 An
overly broad restriction on this kind of conduct could deter the formation of
productive joint ventures, for collaboration typically extinguishes some
competition between the participants. A narrow injunction prohibiting Mi-
crosoft from proposing naked market divisions would do no harm, but it
would not address the full extent of the court's liability determination. In
light of the court's conclusion, Microsoft should be enjoined from offering
consideration to a platform competitor in exchange for an agreement not to
compete. If Microsoft wanted to enter into a joint venture with such a firm,
it could, of course, apply to the court for approval.
The decree is generally consistent with this model. 7° But it prohibits
166 Id. at 400-01.
167 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (§ 7(q)).
168 Id. at 67 (§ 3(c)).
169 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at $ 83.
170 See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (§ 3(h)) ("Microsoft shall not offer, agree to provide, or
provide any consideration to any actual or potential Platform Software competitor in exchange for such
competitor's agreeing to refrain or refraining.., from developing, licensing, promoting or distributing
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agreements with "actual or potential" platform competitors. 7 ' Given the
capacity of this kind of restriction to inhibit productive joint ventures, ex-
tending the restriction to potential competitors, a category that is undefined
and potentially inclusive of most any firm in the industry, is excessive.
CONCLUSION
If Microsoft was a predacious monopolizer, it was because the firm en-
gaged in specific anticompetitive practices. To break up the firm as a sanc-
tion would needlessly impose on consumers substantial, and potentially
enormous, costs as efficiencies that contributed to the phenomenal success
of the firm are destroyed. The only plausible justification for such a remedy
is that the alternative, conduct-based order would be too costly to adminis-
ter. In fact, antitrust enforcement will not be rendered unnecessary by a
structural remedy, and a conduct remedy need not be extremely expensive.
Sensible, enforceable conduct obligations can be drafted that would purge
the market of anticompetitive practices and effects, and would quickly re-
store the but-for world.
any Operating System Product or Middleware Product competitive with any Windows Operating Sys-
tem Product or Middleware Product.").
171 Id.
[VOL. 9:3
